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System Check: Balancing Texas’s Need for Natural 
Resources Exploration with Texas Landowner Rights 
in Light of Texas Rice Land Partners v. Denbury Green 
Pipeline-Texas  
INTRODUCTION 
Oil and gas exploration in Texas is extremely important to the 
state’s citizens, legislators, and the Texas economy. It is so 
important that the Texas Legislature authorized the Railroad 
Commission of Texas to grant common carrier status to pipeline 
companies that seek to use eminent domain to appropriate private 
land.1 Eminent domain refers to the power possessed by the state 
over all property within the state, specifically its power to 
appropriate property for a public use.2 In order for a private entity to 
exercise this power, the Railroad Commission must designate the 
private entity as a common carrier.3 One clear benefit of this power 
is increased oil and gas production in Texas, which is good for the 
Texas economy.4 While this is an ideal situation for oil and gas 
companies and Texas politicians, not everyone in Texas is pleased 
with the manner in which the system works.  
Landowners in Texas are fighting an uphill battle against 
pipeline companies they believe are abusing eminent domain, while 
also fighting against the Texas Legislature, which seems intent on 
allowing eminent domain to be used in a manner inconsistent with 
Texas constitutional requirements. The Texas Constitution provides 
that “[n]o person’s property shall be taken, damaged, or destroyed 
for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being 
made.”5 In order for a taking to be constitutionally valid, the taking 
must be for public use;6 thus, as a corollary, no person’s property 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2014, by CAVARRIO CARTER. 
 1. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.019(a) (West 2011).  
 2. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 601 (9th ed. 2009). 
 3. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 119.019(b) (West 2011) (setting forth 
limitations of common carrier’s eminent domain power).  
 4. Dave Fehling, TransCanada Faces Another Legal Challenge, NPR: STATE 
IMPACT (Sept. 13 2012, 6:00 AM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2012/09/13/key 
stone-pipeline-in-texas-court-let-us-dig/ [http://perma.cc/FUL8-S5CU] (archived 
Feb. 19, 2014) (quoting Tom Zabel, TransCanada’s attorney, who stated, “The 
legislature came up with this scheme because they wanted to promote the 
development of oil and gas in the State of Texas. . . . Texas is the largest producing 
state in the nation. Why? Because the legislature has encouraged the production of 
oil and gas pipelines. Because you can’t have oil and gas production without 
pipelines.”). 
 5. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17.  
 6. See id.  
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may be taken for private use.7 Yet, this is precisely what landowners 
in Texas claim is happening to them regularly.8 While recent 
jurisprudence has sought to rectify this problem, the Texas Supreme 
Court’s efforts fail to prevent abuse of the eminent domain power 
granted to common carriers.9 
Further, deterrence through legislative action appears unlikely. 
After considering all options, criminal sanctions remain the most 
effective means of curbing pipeline companies’ participation in 
eminent domain abuse.10 The problem, however, is that the current 
state of the law leaves the possibility of criminal sanctions shrouded 
in doubt. Fear of criminal prosecution is necessary to deter 
companies that may consider engaging in eminent domain abuse. To 
effect change and prevent further abuse, the entire system for 
becoming a common carrier must be overhauled, especially after the 
Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Texas Rice Land Partners v. 
Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas.11 
Part I of this Comment will discuss the relevant background of 
the public use doctrine as it relates to eminent domain, as well as the 
history of the oil and gas industry and eminent domain in Texas. 
Part II of this Comment will provide a brief overview of recent 
jurisprudence in Texas that addresses the issue of eminent domain 
abuse. While recent decisions have provided landowners with hope, 
these decisions also present several obstacles to combating eminent 
domain abuse via criminal sanctions. Part III of this Comment will 
discuss the context in which criminal liability is possible for those 
who abuse the power of eminent domain and what is required for 
prosecution. Of particular importance in this discussion is the Texas 
Rice Land Partners decision and the problems it poses to criminal 
liability and deterrence.12 Finally, Part IV will present a solution to 
problems addressed throughout this Comment and will weigh the 
pros and cons of both legislative and systemic changes—changes 
that together may make criminal liability not only a theoretical 
possibility but rather an effective, practical tool for combating 
                                                                                                             
 7. See id.  
 8. See Amanda Buffington Niles, Comment, Eminent Domain and Pipelines 
in Texas: It’s as Easy as 1, 2, 3--Common Carriers, Gas Utilities, and Gas 
Corporations, 16 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 271, 271 (2010) (addressing the 
frequency of landowners’ interaction with pipeline companies in context of eminent 
domain abuse).  
 9. See infra Part II (discussing Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury 
Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC, 363 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. 2012), reh’g denied, 381 
S.W.3d 465 (Tex. 2012)).  
 10. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.46 (West 2011 & Supp. 2013) 
(providing the means for addressing eminent domain abuse).  
 11. Texas Rice Land Partners, 363 S.W.3d 192.  
 12. See generally id.  
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eminent domain abuse to preserve the balance between natural 
resources exploration and private landowner rights.  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. History and Scope of the Public Use Doctrine  
Throughout the history of the United States, state governments, 
along with a limited number of private entities, have exercised the 
power of eminent domain in order to take land for public use.13 
What constitutes public use has long been the subject of debate.14 
The dispute over this seemingly self-evident standard has led to 
decades of jurisprudence attempting to spell out precisely the 
meaning of “public use”.15 Generally, there are two widely accepted 
standards for interpreting the public use requirement: the “use by the 
public” test and the “public benefit” test.16 The use by the public test 
reflects a narrow interpretation of the public use requirement and 
holds that public use means any legitimate public purpose or public 
advantage.17 Examples of use under the public standard may include 
public ownership or public access.18 The second and broader 
standard, the public benefit test, includes use for the purposes of 
eliminating blight, redistributing concentrated land, and promoting 
economic development.19  
Although the public benefit standard is considered by many to 
be the more appropriate standard for evaluating what constitutes 
public use, the federal government has declined to declare a general 
                                                                                                             
 13. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
 14. Compare Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798) (“[For example, A] law 
that takes property from A. and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for 
a people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers . . . .”), with Beekman v. 
Saratoga & Schenectady R.R. Co., 3 Paige Ch. 45, 73 (N.Y. Ch. 1831) (“[I]f the 
public interest can be in any way promoted by the taking of private property, it 
must rest in the wisdom of the legislature . . . .”). 
 15. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469 (2005), 
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W. 2d 
765, 769–70 (Mich. 2004); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 
304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981). 
 16. 2A-7 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.02[2]-[3] (Julius L. Sackman 
ed., 3d ed. 2003) (noting two definitions of “public use”—a “broad” and a 
“narrow” definition—“each of which has its ardent supporters among legal 
scholars and courts”). Interpretations of the public use requirement are not limited 
to these two viewpoints.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Id.  
 19. Id.  
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public use standard.20 One reason for refusing to declare a general 
standard is that the meaning of “public use” might vary considerably 
from region to region; thus, it is more appropriate that the meaning 
“public use” be left for the states to define.21 Beginning in the 
twentieth century, however, there has been a push for the broader 
view.22 An illustration of how the public use doctrine has been 
interpreted provides a better understanding of the difficulty 
surrounding application of the doctrine.  
1. Expanding the Public Use Doctrine 
Both state and federal courts have implemented a series of 
varying interpretations, which have in turn favored both broad and 
narrow public use definitions; for many years, this failure to settle 
on a definition complicated the public use doctrine.23 In Poletown 
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, the City of Detroit used its 
power of eminent domain to condemn an entire neighborhood for 
the construction of a new General Motors manufacturing plant.24
 
The affected homeowners argued that the takings were 
unconstitutional because the direct and primary beneficiary of the 
taking was General Motors; thus, the taking would have been for an 
impermissible private use.25 The Michigan Supreme Court, 
however, upheld the condemnations by concluding that “public use” 
                                                                                                             
 20. See United States v. Certain Lands in Louisville, 78 F.2d 684, 686–87 
(6th Cir. 1935), cert. granted, 296 U.S. 567 (1935), cert. dismissed, 297 U.S. 726 
(1936) (“[The] term ‘public use,’ . . . is not susceptible of precise definition under 
the Supreme Court decisions.”); State ex rel. Tomasic v. Unified Gov’t of 
Wyandotte Cnty./Kansas City, Kan., 962 P.2d 543, 553 (Kan. 1998) (“There is no 
precise definition of what constitutes a valid public use . . . .”); Smith v. Cameron, 
210 P. 716, 720 (Or. 1922) (“[It is] difficult, and probably impossible, to frame 
such a definition of the term ‘public use’ . . . .”); Miller v. City of Tacoma, 378 
P.2d 464, 470 (Wash. 1963) (“[T]he words ‘public use’ are neither abstractly nor 
historically capable of complete definition.”). 
 21. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984) (stating that 
“legislatures are better able to assess what public purposes should be advanced by 
an exercise of the taking power.”).  
 22. See infra Part I.A.1. (discussing the expansion of the “public use” 
doctrine).  
 23. Daniel B. Kelly, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A 
Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 
1, 2–3 (2006). 
 24. 2A-7 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.06[7][c][iv] (Julius L. Sackman 
ed., 3d ed. 2003) (tabulating that “[o]ver 465 acres, 3,500 people, and 1,176 
buildings, including 144 businesses, 3 schools, 16 churches, and 1 cemetery, were 
taken by the City of Detroit for a cost exceeding $200 million in order to provide 
land for a new General Motors facility.”). 
 25. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 458 
(Mich. 1981). 
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and “public purpose” could be used interchangeably.26
 
The 
Michigan Supreme Court concluded that, “even though a private 
party will also, ultimately, receive a benefit,” a municipality’s use of 
eminent domain to alleviate unemployment and revitalize the local 
economy constitutes two “essential public purposes.”27 
The Poletown decision resulted in many states interpreting their 
constitutions in a similar manner.28 States that chose to equate 
public use with public purpose created a situation in which almost 
any reasonable justification could be made for taking private 
property.29 Even if a use was inherently private and a private party 
received the primary benefit, the taking could be justified.30  
Recognizing that the state of the public use doctrine left private 
landowners without a reliable standard, the Michigan Supreme 
Court in County of Wayne v. Hathcock unanimously overruled its 
prior decision in Poletown, holding that promoting economic 
development does not constitute a legitimate public use under the 
Michigan constitution.31 The decision in County of Wayne indicated 
a move towards a more restrictive interpretation of the public use 
doctrine. However, the move toward a narrow public use definition 
would not last long because the United States Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Kelo v. City of New London, Connecticut was soon to 
change how the public use doctrine would be applied for years to 
come.32  
                                                                                                             
 26. See id. at 457 (“We are persuaded the terms have been used 
interchangeably in Michigan statutes and decisions in an effort to describe the 
protean concept of public benefit. The term ‘public use’ has not received a narrow 
or inelastic definition by this Court in prior cases.”).  
 27. Id. at 459.  
 28. See, e.g., City of Jamestown v. Leevers Supermarkets, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 
365, 369, 372–74 (N.D. 1996) (relying on Poletown to conclude that “the 
stimulation of commercial growth and removal of economic stagnation . . . are 
objectives satisfying the public use and purpose requirement of N.D. Const. Art. I, 
§ 16”). See also City of Duluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757, 763 (Minn. 1986) 
(citing Poletown and concluding that “revitalization of deteriorating urban areas 
and the alleviation of unemployment are certainly public goals”). 
 29. See Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private 
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1354 (1982) (“The arguments deployed [in 
Poletown] in support of the publicness of this venture could be deployed in 
support of virtually any venture one can imagine.”).  
 30. See Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 769–70, 786 (Mich. 
2004) (stating that Poletown’s “economic benefit” rationale would “validate 
practically any exercise of the power of eminent domain on behalf of a private 
entity” because “[e]very business, every productive unit in society does . . . 
contribute in some way to the commonwealth”). 
 31. Id. at 788.  
 32. Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  
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In Kelo, the United States Supreme Court again expanded the 
public use definition,33 holding that promoting economic 
development does constitute a legitimate public use under the 
federal constitution.34 In that case, New London granted the power 
of eminent domain to a private economic development corporation 
charged with revitalizing the downtown and waterfront areas of the 
city.35 The development corporation decided to remove existing 
homes and small businesses and replace them with privately-owned 
office buildings and a riverfront hotel, all of which would 
complement a new Pfizer global research facility.36 However, nine 
property owners refused to sell, and the development corporation 
resorted to the use of eminent domain to take title to the land.37 City 
authorities argued that the condemnations were justified because the 
city had experienced significant economic decline and was 
designated a “distressed municipality” in 1990.38 
In the Court’s 5-to-4 decision, Justice Kennedy concurred with 
the explanation that, even though he agreed with the majority in the 
outcome, his opinion was that the majority did not “foreclose the 
possibility that a more stringent standard of review . . . might be 
appropriate” for private transfers with a higher “risk of undetected 
impermissible favoritism of private parties.”39 In two dissenting 
opinions, Justice O’Connor and Justice Thomas argued that, under 
the majority’s interpretation of the Public Use Clause, almost any 
private property was now vulnerable to the government’s use of 
eminent domain for a more productive private use.40 Justice Thomas 
                                                                                                             
 33. See Karen C. Fagelson & J. Phillip London, Jr., Kelo: What Lies Ahead for 
Public Use Outside Blighted Areas, BULLETIN (REED SMITH) (2005), http://www 
.reedsmith.com/Kelo--What-Lies-Ahead-for-Public-Use-Outside-Blight ed-Areas-
08-09-2005/ [http://perma.cc/TBT-4MCU] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (stating “Kelo 
went beyond any previous definition. In Berman v. Parker, the court expanded the 
public use definition from only allowing the taking of blighted property to permitting 
taking of private property in a blighted area. Now in Kelo, the court is permitting 
private taking of property that is not blighted or in a blighted area.”) (citation 
omitted).  
 34. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 470. 
 35. Id. at 474–75. 
 36. Id. at 474. 
 37. See id. at 475. 
 38. See id. at 473. 
 39. Id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 40. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Under the banner 
of economic development, all private property is now vulnerable to being taken 
and transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded—i.e., 
given to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more 
beneficial to the public—in the process.”); id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“If 
such ‘economic development’ takings are for a ‘public use,’ any taking is, and the 
Court has erased the Public Use Clause from our Constitution . . . .”). 
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further argued that the majority decision was not well-grounded in 
precedent.41 While the majority defended its holding by asserting 
that, under its interpretation, the Public Use Clause retained 
meaning,42
 
the Court failed to provide any clear standard for 
defining public use or distinguishing between public and private 
uses.43 
2. The Response to Kelo v. City of New London, Connecticut  
The Court’s ruling in Kelo is widely believed to have opened the 
door for the use of eminent domain for private purposes.44 
Landowners were unnerved by the decision, and several states took 
legislative action in an effort to strengthen landowner rights.45 One 
state was Texas.46 Although Texas acted swiftly in an attempt to 
curtail eminent domain abuse following the holding in Kelo, the 
resulting legislation was nevertheless incomplete.47 
Texas’s new laws included restrictions that prohibited a 
government or private entity from taking property if the taking did 
any of the following: (1) conferred a private benefit, (2) was 
pretextual, or (3) was for economic development.48 The legislation 
made the exercise of eminent domain permissible for economic 
development, but only if the exercise was secondary to the main 
objective of eliminating blight.49 The legislation was expected to 
                                                                                                             
 41. See id. at 515 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s 
application of Berman and Midkiff is “further proof that the ‘public purpose’ 
standard is not susceptible of principled application”). 
 42. See id. at 486–87 (noting that “transferring citizen A’s property to citizen 
B for the sole reason that citizen B will put the property to a more productive use 
and thus pay more taxes . . . would certainly raise a suspicion that a private 
purpose was afoot”). 
 43. Id. at 487 (arguing that “the hypothetical cases posited by petitioners can 
be confronted if and when they arise” and “do not warrant the crafting of an 
artificial restriction on the concept of public use”); see also id. at n.19 (noting that 
“[a] parade of horribles is especially unpersuasive in this context, since the 
Takings Clause largely ‘operates as a conditional limitation, permitting the 
government to do what it wants so long as it pays the charge’”) (quoting East. 
Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment 
and dissenting in part)). 
 44. See generally Kennedy, supra note 29. 
 45. See, e.g., 50 State Report Card: Tracking Eminent Domain Reform 
Legislation since Kelo (Texas), CASTLE COALITION, http://castlecoalition.org 
/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1372&Itemid=129 [http://perma 
.cc/Z2V3-5Y2J] (archived Feb. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Coalition Report]. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. 
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prevent eminent domain abuse in Texas, but the results have been 
somewhat dissatisfying.50 
The new legislation also included exceptions to the prohibitions 
so that they do not apply to utilities, port authorities, or other 
specific agencies and projects.51 One such exception included the 
new Dallas Cowboys stadium.52 In 2007, the Texas Legislature 
passed a bill which would have specified that condemnation only 
qualifies as public use when it “allows the state, a political 
subdivision of the state, or the general public of the state to possess, 
occupy, and enjoy the property.”53 The bill would have provided 
even greater protection against common eminent domain abuse 
tactics; however, Governor Rick Perry vetoed the bill.54 
B. Eminent Domain in Texas: A Brief Overview 
Our brief history of eminent domain legislation in Texas begins 
with a statute enacted during the 1895 regular session.55 Landowners 
first challenged the law as unconstitutional in a suit against an 
irrigation company that acquired a right of way over the owners’ 
land for an irrigation canal.56 The statute provided in part:  
[A]ll corporations and associations formed for the purpose of 
irrigation, mining, milling, the construction of waterworks 
for cities and towns, and stockraising as provided in this 
chapter, shall have right of way over public lands, and that 
such corporation or association of persons, as well as cities 
and towns, may obtain the right of way over private property 
and water belonging to riparian owners by condemnation as 
provided in the case of railroads.57 
Since the plaintiffs believed the irrigation company was not 
seeking to take the land for a public purpose, the plaintiffs argued 
that the statute was unconstitutional.58 The plaintiffs also argued that 
the law authorized the creation of “purely private corporations” for 
the operation of wholly private businesses and did not secure any 
                                                                                                             
 50. See id.  
 51. Coalition Report, supra note 45. 
 52. Id. 
 53. H.B. 2006, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007).  
 54. Id.  
 55. 1895 Tex. Rev. Civ. St. 3115–3131.  
 56. Borden v. Trespalacios Rice & Irrigation Co., 86 S.W. 11, 11–12 (Tex. 
1905), aff’d 204 U.S. 667 (1907). 
 57. 1895 Tex. Rev. Civ. St. 3115–3131. 
 58. Borden, 86 S.W. at 14. 
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such use to the public.59 Siding with the irrigation company, the 
Texas Supreme Court reasoned that the corporation was transferring 
water to the public and that “the courts cannot inquire into the 
wisdom or expediency of the regulations adopted by the legislature 
for the protection of the public.”60 This tradition of categorizing 
projects that promote private enterprise as public use continues in 
Texas and plays a major role in the discussion of common carrier 
status and landowner rights.  
1. Texas Law Today 
Legislative bodies may delegate the power to determine whether 
a certain entity will be able to exercise eminent domain or whether 
that entity is one to which the power of eminent domain may be 
granted.61 In Texas, corporations or companies deemed to be 
common carriers may exercise the power of eminent domain. The 
authority to grant such a power has been given to the Texas Railroad 
Commission (TRC).62 Throughout the years, critics have disparaged 
the decisions made by the TRC regarding the designation of 
companies as common carriers.63  
There are three primary designations that a corporation may seek 
in order to obtain the right to exercise eminent domain.64 The first of 
these designations is common carrier status. The Texas Natural 
Resources Code provides, among others, the following possibilities 
for the common carrier designation: (1) owning, operating, or 
managing a pipeline for the transportation of crude petroleum to or 
for the public for hire, or engaging in the business of transporting 
crude petroleum by pipeline; or (2) owning, operating, or managing 
                                                                                                             
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 14–15.  
 61. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. § 2206.001 (West 2008 & Supp. 
2013).  
 62. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.019(b) (West 2011). 
 63. See, e.g., Terri Hall, Property rights activists seek clarity on eminent 
domain use by private entities, EXAMINER.COM (July 24, 2012), http://www 
.examiner.com/article/property-rights-advocates-seek-clarity-on-eminent-domain-
use-by-private-pipeline [http://perma.cc/4US3-NUTP] (archived Feb. 25, 2014) 
(quoting several individuals who express disapproval of the common carrier 
process in Texas); see also Niles, supra note 8 at 291–93 (suggesting stricter 
requirements for designation as a common carrier should be implemented); Saul 
Elbein, Pipeline Companies Seize Land in Texas at Will, TEXASOBSERVER.ORG 
(Aug. 22, 2012, 5:34), http://www.texasobserver.org/pipeline-companies-seize-
land-in-texas-at-will/ [http://perma.cc/SK9V-E2J3] (archived Mar. 16, 2014) 
(discussing concern regarding T-4 application process and significant power given 
to pipeline companies during process).  
 64. Id. at 280.  
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pipelines for the transportation of carbon dioxide or hydrogen in any 
form.65 Texas courts have attempted to arrive at more precise 
definitions than the Natural Resources Code offers but have come 
up short in fashioning a standard that clearly determines common 
carrier status.66 
When a corporation or private entity seeks a designation as a 
common carrier, it must fill out a T-4 application and file the 
application with the TRC.67 The T-4 application consists of various 
questions that seek to determine whether a company will, in fact, be 
operating as a common carrier.68 When a corporation files with the 
TRC, it asserts that the information provided on the form is correct 
to the best of its knowledge.69 For many years, Texas courts did not 
make the determination of whether a company was a common 
carrier.70 By filing with the TRC, a pipeline company was able to 
bypass the courthouse’s determination71 because a TRC application 
constituted an acceptance that the company would be governed by 
the TRC’s provisions.72 Courts simply performed a cursory check to 
establish that it was actually designated as a common carrier once 
the pipeline company filled out the appropriate paperwork.73  
Essentially, the process developed as follows: (1) a company 
would fill out the T-4 application; (2) the TRC would approve the 
application as long as the company agreed to be bound by the TRC’s 
provisions; (3) the company would receive common carrier 
designation; and (4) the court would simply make sure that the 
company was actually approved by the TRC.74 Determining whether 
the pipeline company was truly a common carrier as required by the 
public use clause of the appropriate provision of the Natural 
                                                                                                             
 65. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.002 (West 2011). 
 66. See Niles, supra note 8, at 281. 
 67. See Pipeline Eminent Doman and Condemnation Frequently Asked 
Questions (FAQs), RAILROAD COMMISSION OF TEXAS, http://www.rrc.state.tx.us 
/about/faqs/eminentdomain.php [http://perma.cc/L6QZ-WA8G] (archived Feb. 24, 
2014).  
 68. See Niles, supra note 8, at 282–83. 
 69. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.143 (West 2011) (listing penalties 
for providing fraudulent information during application process).  
 70. Niles, supra note 8, at 282. At the time the Niles article was written, 
Texas Rice Land Partners v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas had not yet been 
decided. As will be discussed later, Texas Rice Land Partners altered the review 
process.  
 71. See id. at 282. 
 72. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.131 (West 2011).  
 73. Niles, supra note 8, at 283. 
 74. See supra Part I.B. (providing extensive discussion of the history of the 
procedure for obtaining common carrier designation).  
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Resources Code was apparently beyond the scope of the courts’ 
duties.75 
Once a pipeline company subjected itself to the TRC as a 
common carrier, the pipeline company received, in effect, the 
“unreviewable authority to condemn land.”76 In addition, the 
qualifications for designation as a common carrier have, arguably, 
been set extremely low77 by the TRC,78 and courts have generally 
given extreme deference to the TRC’s designation of a company as 
a common carrier.  
C. Free Reign: Lack of Accountability for Eminent Domain Abuse 
With the right to eminent domain being fairly easy to obtain in 
Texas, such that landowners’ property could be taken based on the 
presumed integrity of pipeline companies, one might ask why more 
has not been done to curb eminent domain abuse. The answer may 
lie in the significant impact that not allowing these companies to 
exercise eminent domain would have on the Texas economy. It is 
important to review the history of the oil and gas industry in Texas 
in order to illustrate this point properly.  
1. The Oil and Gas Industry in Texas and Political Influence  
During the oil boom in the early 1900s, the need to transport the 
products of oil wells increased dramatically in Texas.79 As a result, 
the legislature declared pipeline companies to be common carriers 
and then granted these companies the right of eminent domain.80 
Throughout the years that followed, Texas passed legislation 
furthering the development of the state’s natural resources at the 
expense of landowners, including granting private companies the 
right of eminent domain for activities such as irrigation, mining, and 
                                                                                                             
 75. See Borden v. Trespalacios Rice & Irrigation Co., 86 S.W. 11, 14 (Tex. 
1905), aff'd, 204 U.S. 667 (1907). 
 76. Niles, supra note 8, at 284 (discussing results of prior jurisprudence 
interpreting courts’ ability to review common carrier decision of TRC). 
 77. As discussed throughout this Comment, the current process by which the 
TRC grants common carrier status has recently been cast into doubt by 
landowners and scholars alike, with emphasis being placed on both the ease of 
qualification and the lack of review by any judicial authority.  
 78. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 111.020(d) (West 2011) (noting that the mere 
acceptance of the TRC’s common carrier provisions can provide a company with 
common carrier status).  
 79. Niles, supra note 8, at 277. 
 80. Humble Pipe Line Co. v. State, 2 S.W.2d 1018, 1019 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1928). 
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stock raising.81 The oil and gas industry was added to the list of 
beneficiaries of eminent domain powers when pipeline companies 
were granted this power by the legislature.82  
The Texas Supreme Court has historically sided with the oil and 
gas companies, adopting an admittedly broad view of what 
constitutes public use.83 In Coastal States Gas Producing Co. v. 
Pate, the Texas Supreme Court stated that the test for determining 
public use is to determine whether there “results to the public some 
definite right or use in the business or undertaking to which the 
property is devoted.”84 Furthering this pro-oil approach to the 
doctrine, courts have also declared that “[i]t is immaterial if the use 
is limited to the citizens of a local neighborhood, or that the number 
of citizens likely to avail themselves of it is inconsiderable, so long 
as it is open to all who choose to avail themselves of it.”85 A use will 
not be deprived of its public character simply because it is 
advantageous to a particular group or individual.86  
Texas courts have also made it clear that the legislature’s 
declaration (that a use is public) “is binding on the court unless it is 
manifestly wrong or unreasonable, or the purpose for which the 
declaration is enacted is ‘clearly and probably private.’”87 Further, 
the right to eminent domain grows out of necessity.88 While this 
statement likely has merit, there is little question that the 
legislature’s discretion in choosing to which entities to grant 
eminent domain power, coupled with the court’s liberal definition of 
public use, has made landowners the losing party in many battles 
against private entities over the use of eminent domain.89 
                                                                                                             
 81. Niles, supra note 8, at 278. 
 82. Id.  
 83. See, e.g., Coastal States Gas Producing Co. v. Pate, 309 S.W.2d 828, at 
832–33 (Tex. 1958) (affirming trial court judgment in favor of Coastal States Gas 
Producing Co., which ruled that Coastal States Gas had the right to condemn land 
for the purpose of drilling a directional well). See also id. at 833 (stating “[the 
Texas Supreme Court] has adopted a rather liberal view as to what is or is not a 
public use”).  
 84. Id. at 833.  
 85. Tenngasco Gas Gathering Co. v. Fischer, 653 S.W.2d 469, 475 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1983) (quoting West v. Whitehead, 238 S.W. 976, 978 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1922)). 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id.  
 88. Imperial Irrigation Co. v. Jayne, 138 S.W. 575, 587 (Tex. 1911). 
 89. Niles, supra note 8, at 279.  
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2. Landowners Are At a Significant Disadvantage 
While political power and judicial interpretations of public use 
may have contributed to Texas landowners’ plight, other factors also 
affect their ability to fight back against private entities that they 
believe are abusing the power of eminent domain. These factors 
include legal and financial constraints, as well as the lack of 
mobilization among affected landowners. Some believe that the use 
of eminent domain should be discouraged due to the increase of 
inordinate private influence and corruption within the eminent 
domain process.90 Add political alignment with private entities and 
it becomes very clear why landowners are discouraged from 
challenging these companies.  
Private parties that would directly benefit from takings have a 
strong incentive to influence the eminent domain process for their 
own private advantage,91 often resulting in “socially undesirable 
transfers.”92 In a taking for private benefit, “the single beneficiary . . 
. has a powerful incentive to capture a concentrated benefit.”93 On 
the other hand, a taking for general public benefit usually involves 
multiple beneficiaries.94 Takings primarily for the general public 
also help to ensure the absence of inordinate influence during the 
takings process.95 As a result, the potential for corruption is higher 
in a taking for a private party than in a taking for the government or 
public.  
Private parties are able to use excessive influence to single-
handedly benefit from a taking, so many landowners will be affected 
by the taking; yet, the effects experienced by each individual 
landowner as a result of the taking may be minor.96 As a result, the 
incentive to oppose the taking may be relatively weak.97 Projects 
that involve multiple owners (as most projects do) also create a 
coordination problem.98 Private parties are capable of using eminent 
                                                                                                             
 90. See Kelly, supra note 23, at 34.  
 91. See id. at 23.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id.  
 95. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation 
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 
223, 229 (1986) (“Pre-existing coalitions and groups of allied individuals will be 
more effective than dispersed individuals in obtaining transfers of wealth from 
society as a whole to themselves.”). 
 96. Kelly, supra note 23, at 35.  
 97. Id.  
 98. See id. at 23–24.  
322 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. 2 
 
 
 
domain to exploit these bargaining problems among the dispersed 
owners.99 
Owners are also at a significant disadvantage when it comes to 
challenging eminent domain abuse due to relatively ineffective 
political checks against the subversive use of eminent domain. As 
previously discussed, there are many reasons why political influence 
will side with private entities.100 First, the period of time that elapses 
between the time of the condemnation and the time at which the 
consequences of the condemnation become known results in the 
diminishment of political accountability.101 This is because the 
members of the legislature, who were instrumental in the 
condemnation proceedings, may not be the same members present 
in the legislature at the time the consequences of the condemnations 
become known. Also, private parties that exercise eminent domain 
are typically heavily involved in legislative proceedings and, 
therefore, regularly have the opportunity to influence legislation.102 
One benefit of being regularly involved in the legislative process is 
the enjoyment of a substantial advantage in the political process.103 
Because of this advantage, the political process will usually be 
unable to compensate for the inordinate influence private parties 
exert in seeking the condemnation authority for their own 
advantage.104  
II. A GOOD FAITH EFFORT: TEXAS RICE LAND PARTNERS, LTD. V. 
DENBURY GREEN-TEXAS, LLC 
The issue in Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green-
Texas began when Denbury Green applied to the Texas Railroad 
                                                                                                             
 99. Id. at 35–37. 
 100. See supra Part I.C.1. (discussing oil and gas significance to the Texas 
economy as reason for political alliance with oil and gas companies). 
 101. Id.  
 102. See Kelly, supra note 23, at 36; see also Donald J. Kochan, “Public Use” 
and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an Interest-Group Perspective, 3 
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 82 (1998) (“[T]he special interest is likely to have more 
political influence, because unlike the landowner, the interest group is probably a 
repeat player in the political process and thereby able to offer more to 
legislators.”).  
 103. See Kochan, supra note 102, at 81–83 (discussing interest-group theory of 
legislation and the role of repeat players in the political process). 
 104. See James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on 
Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1309 n.187 (1985) (noting the 
“inefficient takings that result from the weakness of the political check on the use 
of eminent domain: the corruption, unfairness, or mistakes of elected officials and 
the electorate’s failure to effectively or fairly review the actions of its 
representatives”). 
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Commission for a permit to operate a carbon dioxide pipeline that 
would carry carbon dioxide from a field in Mississippi to various oil 
fields in Brazoria and Galveston County.105 When Denbury Green 
filled out the T-4 application,106 it noted that it would operate as a 
“common carrier” rather than as a “private line.”107 The company 
indicated that it would transport carbon dioxide owned by others and 
that this carbon dioxide would be transported for a fee.108 The 
company also sent a letter to the TRC stating that it would accept the 
provisions of Chapter 111 of the Natural Resources Code, which 
defines the requirements for achieving common carrier status and 
also imposes requirements on the operations of a common carrier 
pipeline.109 The TRC issued a permit for the transportation of carbon 
dioxide through a common carrier pipeline eight days later.110 The 
common carrier status conferred the power of eminent domain upon 
Denbury.111 
Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. owned the property where 
Denbury intended to place its pipeline, and when Denbury attempted 
to survey the land for the purpose of either purchasing or 
condemning a portion of the surface estate for pipeline right-of-way 
purposes, Texas Rice denied entry.112 Denbury sought an injunction 
to prevent Texas Rice’s interference.113 The trial court found 
Denbury was a common carrier, and therefore, it had the power of 
eminent domain.114  
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding 
the following: (1) the determination of whether a pipeline company 
is a common carrier is a question of law;115 and (2) substantial 
                                                                                                             
 105. Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC, 
363 S.W.3d 192, 195 (Tex. 2012), reh’g denied, 381 S.W.3d 465 (Tex. 2012).  
 106. See supra Part I.B.1. (discussing T-4 application).  
 107. Texas Rice Land Partners, 363 S.W.3d at 195–96. 
 108. Id. at 196. 
 109. Id.; see also TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 111.002(6), 111.011–111.025 
(West 2011); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 111.020(d) (West 2011) (stating that 
acceptance of the provision of the Natural Resources Code is a requirement for 
gaining common carrier status). 
 110. Texas Rice Land Partners, 363 S.W.3d at 196. 
 111. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.019(a).  
 112. Texas Rice Land Partners, 363 S.W.3d at 196.  
 113. See id.  
 114. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.019(a); Texas Rice Land Partners, 
Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC, 296 S.W.3d 878 (Texas Ct. App. 
2009) (stating that “[t]he trial court found that Denbury Green proved as a matter 
of law that Denbury Green ‘is a common carrier’”), rev’d, 383 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. 
2012).  
 115. Texas Rice Land Partners, 296 S.W.3d at 879 (citing Vardeman v. 
Mustang Pipeline Co., 51 S.W.3d 308, 312 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001)).  
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deference is to be given to TRC decisions in areas of its expertise.116 
In his dissent, Justice Gaultney rejected the notion that checking the 
boxes and filling out the T-4 form was sufficient for designation as a 
common carrier.117 He reasoned that the record supported a finding 
that the pipeline would be used by Denbury solely to transport its 
own carbon dioxide.118 As a result of this evidence, there were 
unresolved factual questions about whether the common carrier 
decision was consistent with the constitutional requirement that 
prohibits the taking of private property for private, not public, use.119 
The Texas Supreme Court agreed with Justice Gaultney. In the 
court’s revised opinion, the court stated the Natural Resources Code 
requires “so-called ‘common carrier’ pipeline companies to 
transport carbon dioxide ‘to or for the public for hire.’”120 Holding 
that “[u]nadorned assertions of public use are constitutionally 
insufficient,” the court overruled the court of appeals and found that 
(1) a pipeline owner does not obtain the right to condemn private 
property by merely checking the correct boxes on the T-4 
application filed with the TRC; and (2) a landowner can challenge in 
court whether the proposed pipeline is truly public.121 
The court decided that the T-4 permit alone was not enough to 
designate Denbury as a common carrier; therefore, Denbury did not 
have the power of eminent domain.122 Since the mere declaration of 
a company as a common carrier was held to be insufficient, the 
court articulated a standard for determining whether a company 
qualified as a common carrier.123 The court declared that the 
“pipeline must serve the public; it cannot be built only for the 
builder’s exclusive use.”124 Rejecting Denbury’s claim, the court 
held that merely making the pipeline available for public use was 
insufficient to confer common carrier status.125  
Two reasons were offered for the rejection of Denbury’s claim. 
First, the court stated that Denbury’s claim was inconsistent with the 
wording of Section 111.002(6) of the Natural Resources Code; in 
                                                                                                             
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. at 881–83 (Gaultney, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. at 881–82. 
 119. See id. at 883 (citing Maher v. Lasater, 354 S.W.2d 923, 924–25 (Tex. 
1962)); see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17(a). 
 120. Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC, 
363 S.W.3d 192, 195 (Tex. 2012), reh’g denied, 381 S.W.3d 465 (Tex. 2012); see 
also TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.002(6) (West 2011). 
 121. Texas Rice Land Partners, 363 S.W.3d at 195. 
 122. Id. at 198. 
 123. See id. at 200. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 201 (reversing appeals’ court judgment holding that making pipeline 
available for public use is sufficient to confer common carrier status).  
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addition, Denbury’s proposed reading would confer common carrier 
status and eminent domain power even when the pipeline will never 
serve the public by transporting carbon dioxide “to or for the public 
for hire.”126 Second, under Denbury Green’s proposed reading of the 
statute, a company could acquire property through the use of 
eminent domain even when the company knows that no party other 
than itself will ever desire to use the pipeline.127 Ultimately, the 
court found that, in order for a company to qualify as a common 
carrier, a “reasonable probability must exist that the pipeline will at 
some point after construction serve the public by transporting gas 
for one or more customers who will either retain ownership of their 
gas or sell it to parties other than the carrier.”128 The evidence 
presented by Denbury was deemed to be insufficient to establish a 
reasonable probability that such transportation would ever occur.129 
A. The Texas Rice Land Partners Decision: A Closer Look 
The Texas Rice Land Partners decision expressly overruled a 
longstanding tradition in Texas that granted great deference to the 
decisions of the Texas Legislature and the TRC.130 In doing so, 
Texas landowners were granted a new power: the power to 
challenge the decisions of the TRC.131 Even with the ability to 
challenge TRC common carrier determinations, for reasons 
previously discussed, landowners are still unlikely to challenge the 
TRC’s rulings.132 However, even if landowners were to overcome 
the barriers that currently limit their ability to challenge a 
company’s common carrier status, the Texas Rice Land Partners 
decision presents several new obstacles. 
1. The Difficulties Presented by the Texas Rice Land Partners 
Decision  
One of the primary reasons the Texas Rice Land Partners court 
was able to make its factual determination regarding Denbury’s 
common carrier status—that Denbury Green’s pipeline would in 
fact operate as a private pipeline, only carrying Denbury Green’s 
carbon dioxide—was that Denbury operated a website which 
                                                                                                             
 126. Id. 
 127. Texas Rice Land Partners, 363 S.W.3d at 202. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. at 203. 
 130. See id. at 198–99; see also supra Part I.B.1.  
 131. Texas Rice Land Partners, 363 S.W.3d at 198–99. 
 132. See supra Part I.C.2. (discussing various factors that affect landowners’ 
challenges). 
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provided evidence contrary to that provided on its T-4 
application.133 Several portions of the company’s website indicated 
that it would be exclusively for private use.134 One statement on the 
website read:  
We see these sources as a possible expansion of our natural 
Jackson Dome source, . . . and we believe that our potential 
ability to tie these sources together with pipelines will give 
us a significant advantage over our competitors, in our 
geographic area, in acquiring additional oil fields and these 
future potential man-made sources of CO2.135 
While the court used this statement (and similar statements) as 
evidence that Denbury intended to operate a private pipeline, it is 
unlikely that this evidence will exist in many future cases.136 
Pipeline companies that apply for common carrier status after the 
Denbury decision are likely to avoid the use of such incriminating 
statements on websites, or anywhere else.137 Without such 
statements to use as evidence, it will be difficult to prove that a 
company never intends to operate as a public pipeline.138 This will, 
undoubtedly, make landowners’ task even more difficult should they 
choose to challenge a TRC decision.  
Another problem with the Texas Rice Land Partners decision is 
the inherent difficulty in disproving that there is a “reasonable 
probability . . . that the pipeline will at some point after construction 
serve the public.”139 As previously mentioned, it would be difficult 
for landowners to prove that the company intends to operate the 
pipeline privately in the absence of a company expressly stating so 
on its website or another public forum. If a company does not 
provide such information, proving its intent becomes a more 
difficult task. Not only is reasonable certainty a rather unclear 
standard, but the court in Texas Rice Land Partners also failed to set 
forth a requirement that pipeline companies must present certain 
                                                                                                             
 133. Texas Rice Land Partners, 363 S.W.3d at 203. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Since the court in Texas Rice Land Partners made it apparent that such 
statements will be used as proof of intent to operate as a private pipeline, it is 
unlikely that any company applying for common carrier status will deliberately 
place such statements on its website since proof of intent to operate as a private 
pipeline will work to defeat an application for common carrier status. 
 137. See Proving Common-Carrier Status After Denbury, JONES WALKER 
(Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.joneswalker.com/news-publications-783.html [http: 
//perma.cc/6FCR-62VY] (archived Feb. 25, 2014) (discussing practices to avoid 
during common carrier process in light of the Texas Rice Land Partners decision).  
 138. See id.  
 139. Texas Rice Land Partners, 363 S.W.3d at 202. 
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evidence clearly indicating the company’s intent to operate its 
pipeline “to or for the public for hire.”140  
III. THE CHALLENGE WITH DETERRING EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE IN 
THE PIPELINE ARENA 
Texas landowners and activists have alleged eminent domain 
abuse in the pipeline industry for quite some time.141 After much 
public outcry, the Texas Rice Land Partners decision’s standard for 
challenging a company’s common carrier status has opened the door 
for discussion of criminal liability. If a pipeline company falsifies 
documents during the application process, it is a felony offense.142 
However, a reading of criminal statutes providing for liability for 
fraud in conjunction with the Texas Rice Land Partners standard 
demonstrates that holding pipeline companies criminally liable for 
fraud is more difficult than ordinarily believed.  
In Texas, when a court is faced with the issue of how to construe 
a statute, the court looks first to its literal text.143 When examining 
the literal text, courts will “read words and phrases in context and 
construe them according to the rules of grammar and usage.”144 If 
the statutory language is ambiguous, or leads to absurd results that 
the Texas Legislature could not have possibly intended, then courts 
may look outside the wording of the statute to ascertain the 
legislative intent.145 
The Texas Penal Code defines various acts that constitute fraud, 
one of which is the act of securing the execution of a document by 
deception.146 The statute begins by stating, “A person commits an 
offense if, with intent to defraud or harm any person, he, by 
deception . . . causes another to sign or execute any document 
affecting property or service or the pecuniary interest of any 
person.”147 The degree of punishment for the offense is 
proportionate to the value of the affected property, service, or 
                                                                                                             
 140. See id.  
 141. See, e.g., Terri Hall, Property rights activists seek clarity on eminent 
domain use by private entities, EXAMINER.COM (July 24, 2012), http://www 
.examiner.com/article/property-rights-advocates-seek-clarity-on-eminent-domain-
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 142. Id.  
 143. Jones v. State, 323 S.W.3d 885, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 
 144. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Lopez v. State, 253 S.W.3d 
680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). 
 145. Id. (citing Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). 
 146. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.46 (West 2011 & Supp. 2013).  
 147. Id. at § 32.46(a)(1). 
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pecuniary interest.148 That is, the punishment imposed will increase 
as the value of the affected property, service, or pecuniary interest 
increases.149 
For the purpose of prosecuting criminal offenses under Section 
32.46 of the Texas Penal Code (Securing Execution of a Document 
by Deception), deception is defined as follows:  
(A) [C]reating or confirming by words or conduct a false 
impression of law or fact that is likely to affect the judgment 
of another in the transaction . . . (B) failing to correct a false 
impression of law or fact that is likely to affect the judgment 
of another in the transaction, that the actor previously 
created or confirmed by words or conduct, and that the actor 
does not now believe to be true; (C) preventing another from 
acquiring information likely to affect his judgment in the 
transaction; (D) selling or otherwise transferring or 
encumbering property without disclosing a lien, security 
interest, adverse claim, or other legal impediment to the 
enjoyment of property, whether the lien, security interest, 
claim, or impediment is or is not valid, or is or is not a 
matter of official record; or (E) promising performance that 
is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction 
and that the actor does not intend to perform or knows will 
not be performed, expect that failure to perform the promise 
in issue without other evidence of intent or knowledge is not 
sufficient proof that the actor did not intend to perform or 
knew the promise would not be performed.150 
Given the above definition, an element of fraud that might be at 
issue in eminent domain abuse is deception.  
While the Texas Rice Land Partners decision was rendered with 
the best intentions, the ruling may cause significant problems when 
it comes to combating eminent domain abuse in a manner that might 
result in effective deterrence. The Texas Rice Land Partners 
decision itself was backlash against pipeline companies who abuse 
eminent domain; however, pipeline companies will not be deterred 
if landowners fail to challenge the TRC. Without a challenge, no 
evidence of wrongdoing can be revealed. One potential avenue for 
challenging these companies is liability for fraud during the 
common carrier application process.151 However, further scrutiny of 
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the Texas Rice Land Partners decision within the context of 
evaluating the crime of securing a document through deception will 
reveal this task is not as simple as practitioners and activists might 
imagine.  
A. Analyzing a Case of Fraud In Light of Denbury 
For the offense of securing execution of a document through 
deception, the act must be perpetrated with specific intent to defraud 
or harm any person and must cause another to sign or execute any 
document.152 The reasonable probability standard set forth by the 
court in Denbury makes a determination of common carrier status 
extremely challenging.153 The uncertainty the case presents becomes 
quite apparent, especially considering the possibility of fraud during 
the T-4 application. 
In other words, for there to be a basis for deception, there must 
first be a clear rule that articulates the proper manner in which one 
must evaluate the information sworn as correct on an application.154 
For example, in Forkert v. Texas, the defendant applied for 
Medicaid and food stamps.155 Her applications were approved, and 
she received $6,450 in benefits.156 The maximum amount of 
household resources an applicant may have in order to qualify for 
Medicaid and food stamps is $2,000.157 After an applicant submits 
their paperwork, a Texas Department of Human Services (DHS) 
caseworker conducts a follow-up interview so that the information 
                                                                                                             
 
.com/paris-texas-news/2012/08/23/transcanada-wins-ok-to-proceed-with-pipeline-
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from the decision).  
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information provided may be determined. See, e.g., Forkert v. State, No. 08-05-
00224-CR, 2007 WL 2682972 (Tex. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2007) (holding that 
defendant was guilty of crime of securing execution of a document through 
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 155. Forkert, 2007 WL 2682972, at *1. 
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 157. See id.  
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provided on the application can be verified.158 The caseworker then 
submits the applicant's information for processing.159 
After review, it was determined that Mrs. Forkert failed to 
disclose the existence of two accounts to DHS during the application 
stage, one of which had a balance of approximately $58,000.160 
However, on the defendant’s original application, she claimed that, 
between those who live with her, she had $0 in cash.161 While the 
defendant did not have direct access to the accounts, her husband, 
who lived at the same residence, did, and the household benefited 
from the account.162 The court found that there was sufficient 
evidence to convict Mrs. Forkert of securing the execution of a 
document by deception because DHS relied on deceptive 
information to determine that she qualified for benefits, and she 
intentionally provided that false information.163 
There is a notable difference between the situation illustrated 
above and a situation in which a pipeline company could be 
prosecuted for fraud. In a situation where one fraudulently applies 
for Medicaid, there are two primary parties involved. Person A 
(applicant) lies and causes person B (state government) to execute a 
document, which harms person B’s pecuniary interest.164 During the 
T-4 application process, however, it would be Person A (pipeline 
company) that provides deceptive information, causing person B 
(TRC) to execute the T-4 application conferring common carrier 
status. However, there is a third person involved in this situation; it 
is person C (the landowner) whose pecuniary interest would be 
affected.  
Nevertheless, the statute states that the deception must be 
perpetrated with specific intent to defraud or harm any person and 
must cause another to sign or execute any document.165 Based on a 
plain reading of the statute, as required by Texas methods of 
statutory interpretation, prosecution of the pipeline corporation 
would still be possible despite the fact that there is an intermediary 
between the deceptive applicant and the person whose pecuniary 
interest is affected.  
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While criminal liability is desirable in light of other failed 
methods of deterrence,166 it is likely unattainable with the current 
state of determining common carrier status set forth in Texas Rice 
Land Partners. If a pipeline company filled out a T-4 application, 
and it was later shown that the company intentionally provided 
deceptive information on the application, there would probably be a 
basis for prosecution.167 However, the problem rests on the 
company’s intent. The deception would be based on a finding that 
the company checked the common carrier box when, in fact, the 
company knew it was not a common carrier. In order to prove that 
the company knew it was not a common carrier, the government 
must demonstrate that the company knew that it would be operating 
the pipeline privately. Several problems arise in carrying this burden 
of proof.  
The Texas Rice Land Partners decision seems to be out of touch 
with the historical definition of public use in Texas. The court in 
Texas Rice Land Partners makes clear that reasonable certainty of 
public use “at some point after construction” is required.168 
However, further into the opinion, the court declined to find that the 
pipeline would be made available to the public “at some point after 
construction” when Denbury presented evidence that there was a 
“possibility” that it would be “transporting other people’s CO2 in the 
future.”169 The court stated that this evidence was insufficient to 
prove a reasonable certainty because the person who presented the 
testimony failed to “identify any possible customers and was 
unaware of any other entity unaffiliated with Denbury Green that 
owned CO2 near the pipeline route in Louisiana and Mississippi.”170 
The court’s use of the language, “at some point,” seems to 
indicate that it is willing to allow pipeline companies to satisfy the 
bar for common carrier status even if the other users are not 
identified at the time of application.171 However, the court’s 
reasoning abandons this position; namely, the court’s reasoning 
requires that there be definitive evidence presented at the time of a 
common carrier status challenge regarding those companies (or 
consumers) that will use the pipeline in the future.172  
                                                                                                             
 166. See supra Part I.C.2. (discussing other ineffective methods of deterrence).  
 167. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.46. 
 168. See Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, 
LLC, 363 S.W.3d 192, 202 (Tex. 2012), reh’g denied, 381 S.W.3d 465 (Tex. 
2012). 
 169. Id. at 203 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 170. Id. 
 171. See id. at 202. 
 172. By refusing to accept evidence presented by Denbury Green of the 
possibility that the pipeline would transport “other people’s CO2 in the future” as 
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The court in Texas Rice Land Partners fails to recognize that 
there are several reasons why a company may initially seek to 
construct a pipeline, yet fail to identify outside users or consumers at 
the time immediately prior to construction, or those who would use 
the pipeline for hire thereby establishing its public use status. In its 
decision, the court seems to ignore a fairly obvious fact regarding 
the timing of a landowner’s potential challenge: the challenge occurs 
very early in the pipeline project process—before the route is 
finalized and often before commercial agreements with customers 
and/or shippers are consummated.173 This is the stage where 
challenges to the power of eminent domain are most frequently 
asserted.174  
Landowners generally would like to prevent construction of a 
pipeline prior to its commencement, rather than after condemnation 
proceedings have already started. Therefore, the challenge is likely 
to occur shortly after common carrier status is conferred but before 
the pipeline company has identified actual consumers or before it 
has any tangible agreements for “public use for hire.” This makes it 
extremely unlikely that a pipeline owner will be able to identify 
other possible consumers with actual and definitive evidence, as the 
court in Texas Rice Land Partners requires. An advocate for 
landowners may initially believe this to be beneficial for the 
landowners. While this may be true for a single landowner in an 
isolated situation, such a result is not good for the overall objective 
of deterring widespread eminent domain abuse because an 
underdeveloped standard allows pipeline companies wiggle room in 
the event they are stretching the truth on a T-4 application.  
There will likely be much disagreement over the application of 
Texas Rice Land Partners as time progresses.175 The Texas Rice 
Land Partners court stated that the decision was limited to the issue 
presented, only as it pertained to carbon dioxide pipelines, and that it 
was making no ruling on the interpretation of the remaining sections 
                                                                                                             
 
proof that the pipeline would be made to the public “at some point after 
construction, ” the court appears to be requiring something greater in order to meet 
it’s reasonable certainty standard (i.e., closer to definitive evidence).  
 173. Kenneth E. McKay, CLE Presentation at the University of Texas School 
of Law: The Denbury Decision: What it Says, What it Doesn’t Say & What 
People Say it Says (August 23–24, 2012), available at http://www.lockelord 
.com/files/News/c69e59db-f7e6-4d6b-acd8-25e804a9d132/Presentation/NewsAtta 
chment/738ed5a3-9ad3-4204-86b8-2741c22329ea/McKay%20Denbury%20Paper 
.pdf [http://perma.cc/S3HL-8QM7] (archived Feb. 25, 2014). 
 174. Id. (assuming that a landowner actually asserts a challenge).  
 175. Id. (discussing the likelihood that interpretations of Texas Rice Land 
Partners decision will vary).  
2014] COMMENT 333 
 
 
 
of the Natural Resources Code dealing with common carrier 
status.176 The result will undoubtedly be an inconsistent application 
of the common carrier status standard set forth by the Texas Rice 
Land Partners court. If courts are inconsistent in determining what 
qualifies as reasonable certainty, how can pipeline companies truly 
be found to be guilty of fraudulent conduct through deception?  
In a situation where one applies for Medicaid, there is a clear 
rule articulated: an applicant can have no more than $2,000 in 
resources per household.177 The same cannot be said regarding 
common carrier status because the Court in Texas Rice Land 
Partners failed to state what evidence would satisfy the burden of 
proving that a company is a common carrier. If the court did this 
there would be a clear rule, and any pipeline company that filled out 
a T-4 application stating it was a common carrier, knowing it did not 
meet the requirements for common carrier status laid out by the 
court—perhaps hoping that no landowner would challenge its 
common carrier status and thereby avoiding the production of 
evidence proving it was in fact a common carrier—would be subject 
to criminal prosecution.  
An example of the conflicting interpretation issue can be seen in 
a recent decision issued by a Lamar County judge regarding the 
Keystone pipeline.178 The judge in that case declined to apply Texas 
Rice Land Partners although the landowner challenging eminent 
domain strongly argued that the case applied.179 While a pipeline 
that has national implications is significantly different from one that 
may have only local implications, the point remains that the 
possibility for inconsistent application of Texas Rice Land Partners’ 
reasonable certainty standard presents a significant hurdle for what 
may be one of the only remaining methods of deterring pipeline 
companies in Texas from engaging in eminent domain abuse. The 
Texas Rice Land Partners decision, while well intended, may 
actually limit one of the few methods available to combat eminent 
domain abuse: criminal liability for fraud.  
IV. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
While deception is the key to guilt for the crime of fraud, the 
Texas Rice Land Partners’ decision and its reasonable certainty 
                                                                                                             
 176. See Texas Rice Land Partners, 363 S.W.3d at 202 n.28. 
 177. Forkert v. State, 2007 WL 2682972, at *1.  
 178. See generally Saul Elbein, Judge Upholds Eminent Domain for Pipeline 
in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2012, at A16.  
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standard makes such a finding extremely difficult and only further 
complicates the matter of eminent domain abuse. Since the Texas 
Rice Land Partners decision was limited to carbon dioxide 
pipelines, criminal liability in situations in which eminent domain 
abuse is most likely to occur is probably not possible. Eminent 
domain abuse will generally occur when pipelines with a greater 
economic benefit are to be constructed. These pipelines include 
those such as crude oil and natural gas.180  
Although there is support from the Texas Rice Land Partners 
decision expressing that its ruling should not be applied beyond the 
scope of carbon dioxide pipelines,181 there is sufficient reason to 
support application of the standard to other types of pipelines. In 
fact, litigants in Texas have begun to present arguments that the 
standard should be applied broadly.182 Applying the standard 
broadly ensures that, when a bright line rule for what is sufficient to 
establish oneself as a common carrier is articulated, the possibility 
of fraud for running astray of this standard will extend to all 
pipelines, especially those which have the greatest incentive to 
abuse the power of eminent domain.183 The problem is actually 
articulating a rule.  
Once a rule is established, the application process needs to be 
revisited. The power to determine common carrier status cannot be 
left in the hands of the TRC. While landowners currently have the 
power to challenge common carrier status, they are still unlikely to 
do so with much frequency.184 Consequently, evidence that would 
uncover fraudulent behavior is unlikely to come to light with enough 
frequency to effectuate deterrence, even if a few landowners do 
challenge a company’s status. The incentive to game the system will 
still be great for most pipeline companies because the likelihood of 
detection will remain relatively low. Hence, even with a rule laying 
out precisely what will suffice to establish oneself as a common 
carrier, the process of review will need to be revamped.  
                                                                                                             
 180. See The World’s 25 Biggest Oil Companies, FORBES, www.forbes.com 
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Requiring a pipeline company seeking common carrier status to 
apply before the court is a much more effective standard. The 
process of filling out the application with the TRC may remain, but 
courts should be granted power beyond a mere cursory check, even 
if a landowner does not challenge the common carrier status. In fact, 
these checks should be random.185 However, requiring courts to 
simply check whether or not a pipeline company has agreed to be 
governed by the TRC is merely a perpetuation of the problem. The 
incentive for those in political power to protect pipeline companies 
known not to be common carriers it far too great. The system in 
place is designed to protect pipeline companies that are not actually 
common carriers and therefore should not have the power of 
eminent domain. Those in power are likely well aware of the low 
percentage of landowners who will actually challenge a pipeline 
company’s status. The situation is being taken advantage of for the 
sake of economic gain and it should be allowed no longer.  
If the legislature grants courts the power to go beyond a mere 
cursory check and require a substantive evaluation of a company’s 
compliance with public use requirements by determining what 
evidence will support a finding that a company is a common carrier, 
pipeline companies will no longer be able to manipulate the system. 
This will almost immediately deter fraudulent behavior. The 
legislature may, however, refuse to grant courts this power at the 
beginning of the common carrier process. But once a rule for 
determining common carrier status has been developed, eminent 
domain abuse can still be curbed.  
CONCLUSION 
Eminent domain abuse, as it relates to pipeline companies and 
the TRC, is a serious problem in Texas. The political influence of oil 
and gas companies has resulted in legislation that is meant to give 
pipeline companies every advantage possible during the common 
carrier application process. Couple this with the strong incentive to 
defraud landowners, and what remains is a system that allows 
pipeline companies to manipulate the system for private gain. While 
the Texas Rice Land Partners decision made an attempt to help 
landowners, it may have resulted in more harm than good by 
making one of the few remaining methods of deterring eminent 
domain abuse (criminal liability) difficult to achieve. Legislative 
protections are desirable, but the potential for political influence 
                                                                                                             
 185. This is assuming the numbers of T-4 applications filed each year are so 
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great of a burden on the Texas courts.  
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from the oil and gas companies makes it unlikely that any legislative 
changes to deter pipeline companies from engaging in fraudulent 
practices will be implemented.  
Sending a strong message to pipeline companies that fraudulent 
practices will result in criminal liability is the best way to deter these 
companies from engaging in fraudulent practices. In order for this to 
happen, however, significant changes need to be made in the review 
process regarding the determination of which companies are, and 
which companies are not, common carriers. The power of eminent 
domain is absolutely necessary to the continuing growth of the 
Texas economy; however, when the scales are unjustly tipped in the 
favor of pipeline companies, the line between public use and private 
gain become blurred. 
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